Introduction
In the wake of the great recession and ancillary financial crises, the European Union and the United States launched a joint, ambitious effort in 2013 to negotiate a comprehensive trade and investment agreement. Known as the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership Agreement (T-TIP), the negotiation process that has ensued is supposed to bring about tariff-free trade in goods, reduction of non-tariff barriers (NTBs) for goods and services, liberalization of public procurement markets, and greater cooperation on market regulation. Systemically, the negotiations have been characterized as both an important step forward for the multilateral trading system, and an existential threat to that same system. Given that the EU and US account collectively for a substantial share of global production and world trade in goods and services, these negotiations have the potential for a major economic impact on third countries.
At this stage, the shape and coverage of a final T-TIP agreement remain uncertain. Indeed, the T-TIP would actually be as a set of trade agreements.
While the negotiations are formally bilateral, the agenda means that they entail the 50 States in the US and the 28 Members of the EU. A successful agreement needs to take into account particularities of a great number of different partners and thus on substance amounts to a new type of mini-lateral agreement. It also needs to cover areas ranging from broad tariff concessions to sector-specific questions of regulation. While tariff reductions are relatively straightforward, an important ambition under T-TIP actually relates to greater coherence and convergence of regulatory standards. Any progress on regulatory convergence (and better cross-recognition of standards) would require enhanced cooperation in rule making. As such the agenda is not as straightforward as tariff elimination.
Indeed, there is growing recognition that a successful T-TIP agreement would likely combine rapid liberalization in some areas (such as tariffs) with institutional mechanisms set up to allow progressive, long run liberalization in 1 others. Such institutional mechanisms, if they offer solutions that can be translated to other situations, might then offer solutions to a broader set of countries that are also grappling with regulatory barriers to trade and investment. Alternatively, there is legitimate worry that they may instead offer new channels for discriminatory management of trade and investment flows.
The T-TIP is attention grabbing, in part, simply because of the magnitudes involved. From Table 1 To appreciate the context of T-TIP, both for the EU and US, but also for third countries, it is also useful to focus on trade intensity, reported in the Figure 1 -1 as trade scaled by partner GDP. For example, EU and US trade with the world is valued at roughly 13 percent of global GDP. This means that for each $100 billion in global income, we see $13.3 billion in trade involving the EU and/or the US. In the case of Asia, for every $100 billion in GDP, there is $9.9 billion in trade (exports and imports) with the US, and $7.6 billion in trade with the EU. Asian trade with the EU and US combined is therefore worth 17.6 percent of Asian GDP. 1 Stark asymmetries are evident, especially with low-income countries.
For low-income countries, while trade with the US and EU is worth 18.3 percent of their GDP, its worth roughly 0.2 percent of EU and US GDP. Viewed in this context, though the EU and US account for high shares of GDP and trade, in a sense the flows between them seem relatively low. For example, while in Asia each $100 billion in exports is associated with $17.6 billion in trade with the EU and/or the US, a similar figure for the EU and US themselves tells us that for each $100 billion in transatlantic GDP, we see only $2.7 billion in trade in goods and services. In other words, scaled by GDP, the EU and US both have much more intense trade relationships with other countries and regions than they do with each other. Much of this is may be explained by economic structure.
Both economies are mature, with high GDP shares derived from services: 75 percent of the EU value added is in services; 82.3 percent of US value added is in services. As services are less traded, this helps explain the lower bilateral flows.
Such factors should be controlled for when we turn to gravity modelling, as otherwise we may mislead ourselves into thinking low trade intensity means high trade barriers. Yet even controlling for such factors, at this stage we should already note the sense reflected in the negotiating mandate that transatlantic trade underperforms. The logic is that with shifts in technology and organization 3 of production toward more global and regional value chains that cross international borders, behind the border issues whose trade cost impacts were once second or third order are increasingly important. Without necessarily changing policy, what were once domestic regulatory issues have emerged as potential sources of NTB-related trade costs in a world of international production and associated returns to scale. To some extent, the US has dealt with these changes in NAFTA with respect to its North American partners (especially for motor vehicles). The same holds for Europe in the context of the EU single market. The T-TIP is approached with the combined NAFTA and EU single market experience helping to frame the current negotiations on regulatory divergence and mutual recognition of standards.
We have organized our discussion as follows. In Section 2, we focus first on important qualitative issues (i.e. things we do not try to quantify primarily because we can't) that help frame the more quantitative analysis that follows. In Section 3, we then turn to structural gravity modelling (i.e. estimating equations based on the trade equations in our computational model introduced in Section 4) to control for factors like economic structure and both physical and cultural distance that affect trade flows. On this basis, we gauge possible trade cost reductions under T-TIP, based on a mix of past experience with regional trade agreements (RTAs) with respect to goods trade, firm-based evidence on goodsbased trade costs not addressed by past RTAs, and recent data from the World Bank, OECD, and WTO on services barriers and recent services commitments.
With trade cost estimates in hand, we then turn to a computational model of the world economy in Section 4. This model reflects actual production and trade in 2011. On this basis, we discuss possible impacts of T-TIP based trade cost reductions for the EU and US economies, but also for third countries. Concluding comments, thoughts, and ruminations are offered in Section 5. 
Regulation, politics, and keeping NTBs in context
It should be stressed that in contrast to reducing tariffs, the removal of NTBs is not so straightforward. There are many different reasons and sources for NTBs.
Some are unintentional barriers while others reflect deliberate public policy. As such, for many NTBs, removing them is not possible because, for example, they require constitutional changes, unrealistic legislative changes, or unrealistic technical changes. Removing NTBs may also be difficult politically, for example because there is a lack of sufficient economic benefit to support the effort;
because the set of regulations is too broad; or because consumer preferences or language preclude a change. Indeed even where public perception is not congruent with scientific evidence, we need to keep in mind that it's the public that votes, not the evidence. In recognition of these difficulties, we follow recent studies by focusing on the set of possible NTB reductions (known as "actionable"
NTBs) given that many will remain in place. Of those NTBs that can feasibly be reduced, we focus on different levels of ambition for NTB reduction. 2
This raises the issue of what might we plausibly expect to be the result of a successful T-TIP negotiation. In addition to differences over matters of fact (economics as a body of knowledge is far from settled on many positive issues with respect to what drives outcomes in national economies and their relationship to other economies), we expect difficulties to arise over matters of genuine differences in social goals and the way those goals are embedded in national legal orders and we also expect outcomes to be affected by distributive struggles in the national (and in the case of the EU, in the Community level) political arena.
2 In benchmarking studies leading into the T-TIP talks, such as ECORYS (2009), there was a strident debate between regulators and trade officials centred on semantics and acronyms. One man's barrier is another man's reasonable measure, or in other words regulatory measures might not be deliberate barriers. While noting the importance of this distinction in some circles, for simplicity here we will call all regulatory and non-tariff instruments that impede trade as non-tariff barriers (NTBs) while recognizing that some of these are perfectly legitimate measures, and in such cases the less pejorative term perhaps ought to be non-tariff measures (NTMs). Calling them all NTBs, we focus instead on dividing the trade-restricting aspects of all measures into those that can be reduced and those that cannot, defined elsewhere in this paper as "actionable" and "non-actionable" NTBs.
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Consider first distributive politics. There is now a sizable literature, in
Economics and Political Science, on the ways political struggles over the returns to trade (and the losses realized by particular households and sectors in both the short-and long-run) affect the outcomes of domestic trade politics and, more relevant for the purposes of this paper, the outcomes of trade negotiations (Grossman and Helpman, 1995a, b, Ornelas, 2005a) . The usual goal of political economy papers in general is to explain deviations from optimal policies, so it is not surprising that most of this work emphasizes how politics cause deviations from "Liberal trade" (Krishna, 1998 , Levy, 1997 , Ornelas, 2005b Ethier (1982) . At least since the classic paper of Balassa (1966) , intra-industry trade (IIT) has been seen as less disruptive than interindustry trade (Brülhart, 2002 and while this inference is not as well-grounded theoretically as we tend to think (Lovely and Nelson, 2000, 2002) , there appears to be empirical support for the claim. Culture is inherently difficult to identify, but it goes to the heart of national identity. US firms currently dominate the global cultural marketplace. It is easy to see arguments for globalization as thinly veiled special pleading for US television and filmmakers, music and print publishers, et cetera. It is just as easy to see arguments against globalization as thinly veiled special pleading for national (read "non US") producers of the same goods. However, "culture wars"
in the US make clear just how strong are claims about the link between culture and identity (Huntington, 2005) . Especially in moments of economic uncertainty, "culture" and identity become strong instruments indeed in the political arena. The politics of culture will always be difficult and unpredictable precisely because they are not anchored in material interests but elicit strong responses at the ballot box.
Food safety regulation does not turn on quite such strongly intangible concerns, but still produces very different responses. Food safety is, of course, a shared value between citizens and governments of both the EU and the US, and yet the approaches are fundamentally different. The problem is that many technologies have uncertain future effects and, if the effects are at least plausibly sufficiently large, it is necessary to weigh the gains from admitting such goods into the food system against (possibly low probability) costs. US law emphasizes immediate scientific process. If chlorine washed chicken and genetically modified organisms cannot be shown to be dangerous with a high degree of certainty, there is a presumption that they should be permitted to enter the market. The
European approach emphasizes instead the precautionary principle-i.e. to the extent that we might reasonably suppose that they constitute risks to the food system, proponents of sales of chlorine washed chicken or GMOs must prove that they are safe with a high degree of certainty. These are both reasonable, but debatable, principles for evaluating uncertain prospects (Gollier et al., 2000, important that we recognize them where they may provide cause for us to be careful in our policy recommendations. Sunstein, 2005) . The statement that "both countries agree on the goal of food safety" only goes so far in resolving a fundamental legal difference about how to evaluate policies in pursuit of that goal. In addition, of course, parties facing redistributive effects from any harmonization can use legitimate differences between weighting of type-1 and type-2 error as tools in rent seeking. In all three of these cases, as well as many others (some of which are discussed elsewhere in this paper), these considerations make welfare evaluation difficult.
It is generally the case that, in all three cases, harmonization that results in increased trade has a first-order welfare improving effect for all the usual reasons. Nonetheless, because these policies involve substantial uncertainties and externalities, those effects cannot be the whole story, especially from an expected welfare point of view. At the same time, precisely because of uncertainties about both technical details and true preferences, it is not at all clear how to incorporate such considerations in our analysis. We follow the keyless drunk in being systematic about those things that permit systematic evaluation and we remind the reader that this is only part of the story. 8 We console ourselves that both the EU and the US possess robust democratic political systems whose purpose, among other things is to make determinations about difficult social trade-offs.
Quantifying scope for trade cost reductions in T-TIP
We turn next to quantifying possible trade cost reductions under T-TIP. For tariffs this is relatively straightforward. For NTBs, on the other hand, it is less so.
Therefore, we start with the easier task of describing tariffs. We then move on to estimates of trade cost reductions for goods in past RTAs, and estimates specific to the EU-US context. We save the most speculative for last -trade cost reductions for services.
a. Tariffs
Though both US and EU average tariffs are similar, there is heterogeneity when we break down tariff protection by sector. From Figure 3 -1, the most striking cases are motor vehicles and processed foods. The EU tariffs on these products are substantially higher than corresponding US tariffs, and indeed far higher than the trade-weighted average MFN tariff for goods overall. For motor vehicles 9 the EU applies an average tariff (7.9 per cent) that is over seven times higher than the US. For processed food products, EU average tariffs (15.8 per cent) are more than three times higher than US average tariffs. Though primary agriculture appears relatively open, this is misleading. Protection in this sector takes the form of a wife variety of NTBs, as will be see in the next subsection.
b. NTB liberalization in FTAs
We now turn to the trickier question of possible trade cost reductions linked to
NTBs. As noted above, such cost savings may follow from cross-recognition of standards (a process where industry plays a central role) to acceptance of 9 Motor vehicles sector in this case includes also parts and components.
regulations (a process where regulators need to find common ground and essentially trust the approach taken by comparable agencies on the opposite side of the pond) to even joint regulation and development of joint standards. None of this can be considered as easy. While examples such as "run drug trials once and not twice" might seem obvious places to start, as noted in Section 2, differences in social/political approach to risk and consumer protection render even the obvious into something more complex and murky. 10 One place to look, in terms of estimating possible reductions in trade costs, is the impact we observe from past trade agreements. The EU itself, for example, has been engaged in a decades long exercise not unlike the goals stated for the T-TIP.
We have also seen other trade agreements, ranging from shallow tariff-only FTAs to relatively deep and comprehensive agreements, like the NAFTA. These may provide some guidance on the magnitude of trade cost reductions that we might expect, if T-TIP ends of looking like the deeper end of existing agreements.
In formal terms, we have implemented a gravity model of trade, estimated in a cross-section of data for the year 2010 for goods at the level of aggregation used for our computational model, and comparable to earlier ECORYS (2009) aggregates. 11 This means we specify bilateral trade flows in levels as an exponential function of a log-linear index that is composed of three classes of determinants: exporter-specific factors (measuring supply potential of exporting countries), importer-specific factors (measuring demand potential of importing countries), and bilateral factors (measuring trade impediments in a broad sense). We specify exporter-specific and importer-specific factors as country fixed effects and parameterize bilateral factors in the log-linear index as a function of observable country-pair-specific variables. Thereby, we ensure that the parameters on the later exhibit a structural interpretation that permits using them in a subsequent comparative static analysis of a model that is calibrated to data on trade and production at the same level of aggregation, where the trade equations in the model are consistent with those in the gravity model itself.
A more technical discussion of the econometrics is provided in the annex.
For explanatory variables we include log bilateral distance, common border, common language, and former colonial ties. We also include a measure of political distance based on measures from the political science literature (polity). 12 We have also included the bilateral tariff margin granted in free trade agreements (measured as the difference between the most-favoured nation rate, which is subsumed under the importer-specific fixed effect, and the rate used in Since prices and incomes will adjust in general equilibrium, the "treatment effect" of greater agreement depth will vary across country-pairs, accruing to differences in endowments, technology levels, and trade costs.
EU membership, with all its provisions that are directly and indirectly related to goods trade, exhibits a direct semi-elasticity of 0.451, or 100x(e 0.451 -1)≈56.99 percent. Notice that this is bigger than the effect of switching from no agreement at all to a deep agreement of grade seven for non-EU countries. The direct gains from EU integration are particularly large for primary energy, primary agriculture, motor vehicles, and metals. Table 3 -2 summarizes the ad-valorem equivalents (AVEs) of non-tariff trade-cost factors in columns A and B. These are based on the regression coefficients in Table 3 -2 we have computed two tariff-equivalents, one for cost-savings from EU membership (i.e., the deepest trade agreement in our sample) and one for estimated cost reductions following from the deepest observed FTAs (so indexed as 7). The results suggest that the tariff-equivalent effects of intra-EU preferences are largest for primary agriculture and processed foods, followed by metals and fabricated metals. We also observe differences in, both positive and Columns C and D in Table 3 -2 provide another basis for analysis. These are from the ECORYS (2009) study of transatlantic NTBs. Those estimates are also gravity based, from a similar estimation framework to that reported in Table 3 sectors where we have available estimates in the second set of columns, the estimates are generally quite similar, especially is we focus on the intra-EU estimates as a benchmark. Interestingly, though tariffs on primary agriculture were shown above to be relatively low, from the estimates in and assessments of GATS bindings and how these compare to RTA services commitments from the WTO (Roy, 2011 (Roy, database updated 2013 . Table 3 -3 below provides summary information for services for the EU and the US.
The first two columns provide estimated AVEs of market access restrictions in services on the basis of the World Bank's STRI database (Jafari, 2014) and are comparable to estimates from other sources. They represent actual levels of market access. Columns C and D provide a different perspective. These provide scores from 0 to 100, where 0 means no binding commitments have been made and 100 means full commitments have been made to bind policies linked to market access for particular sectors. A similar message is provided by How do we interpret the data in Table 3 -3? Based on past experience, neither the US nor the EU has shown a willingness to make binding commitments to open 20 service sectors where protection actually matters. This does not mean we cannot speculate on a situation where we depart from past behavior. However, this means we will be embarking on numerical speculation, even more so than usual, when we include services in out numerical modeling.
Numerical modelling of T-TIP
We turn next to a numerical analysis of the impact of T-TIP based NTB cost In what follows, we first provide a broad overview of the model. We then develop a set of experiments based on our discussion in Section 3 of NTB-based cost reductions in FTAs. This is followed by discussion of the results of the computational experiments. We emphasize both EU-US effect and third country effects. With respect to third countries we also examine the possible importance of what are called "regulatory spillovers." Basically, with a deep agreement on NTBs, it has been argued that third countries might also benefit to a limited extent, in terms of some improvement in market access. The logic is that, with deep regulatory reform, at least some of the changes are likely to affect all players, and not just the EU and US firms, as redrafted regulations might not (but could be) be formulated to explicitly be applied differently to different countries. This is an obvious difference from preferential tariff reduction. In addition, as with investment treaties, firms may be able to relocate operational headquarters to qualify for better regulatory treatment. For example, where the US recognizes EU standards, firms in other countries might then find it easier to then meet US standards themselves. For example, Switzerland is already streamlining/harmonizing its technical regulations with the EU's through a mutual recognition agreement. Therefore Switzerland might be expected to actually benefit from realized MFN spillovers. For other countries (especially low income ones) this seems less plausible to us.
a. Overview of the model
Our computational model belongs to a class of models known as computable general equilibrium (CGE) models. 16 In the model there is a single representative or composite household in each region. Household income is allocated to government, personal consumption, and savings. In each region the composite household owns endowments of the factors of production and receives income by selling the services of these factors to firms. It also receives income from tariff revenue and rents accruing from import/export quota licenses. Part of the income is distributed as subsidy payments to some sectors, primarily in agriculture.
Taxes are included at several levels in the model. Production taxes are placed on intermediate or primary inputs, or on output. Tariffs are levied at the border.
Additional internal taxes are placed on domestic or imported intermediate inputs,
and may be applied at differential rates that discriminate against imports. Where relevant, taxes are also placed on exports, and on primary factor income. Finally, 16 There are strong similarities to the recent class of structurally estimated general equilibrium models. Our trade equations are parameterized econometrics reflecting the first order equilibrium conditions for the computational model. However, we do not assume that all observed deviations in actual trade from predicted trade (i.e. not explained by pairwise distance or by size of markets) results from unobserved policy-based NTBs. As such, calibrating of fitted CES weights reflects a combination of variety effects, market size effects, and also underlying NTBs and taste differences not captured in the pairwise explanatory variables included in the econometric analysis. See Francois, Manchin and Martin (2013) , (Hertel, 1997) , Hertel (2013) , De Melo and Tarr (1992) , and Francois and Shiells (1994) for more discussion on these points.
where relevant (as indicated by social accounting data) taxes are placed on final consumption, and can be applied differentially to consumption of domestic and imported goods.
On the production side, in all sectors, firms employ domestic production factors (capital, labour and land) and intermediate inputs from domestic and foreign sources to produce outputs in the most cost-efficient way that technology allows.
In some sectors, perfect competition is assumed, with products from different regions modelled as imperfect substitutes based on CES preferences (known as the Armington assumption).
Manufacturing and business services are modelled with monopolistic competition. Monopolistic competition involves scale economies that are internal to each firm, depending on its own production level. An important property of the monopolistic competition model is that increased specialisation at intermediate stages of production yields returns due to specialisation, where the sector as a whole becomes more productive the broader the range of specialised inputs. In models of this type, part of the impact of policy changes in final consumption follows from changes in available choices (the variety of goods they can choose from). Similarly firms are affected by changes in available choices (varieties) of intermediate inputs. Changes in available varieties also involve changes in available foreign varieties, in addition to domestic one. As a result, changes in consumer and firm input choices will "spill-over" between countries as they trade with each other.
Tariffs and tariff revenues are explicit in the standard GTAP database, and therefore can be directly incorporated into the model used here directly from the standard database. However, NTBs affecting goods and services trade, as well as cost savings linked to trade facilitation are not explicit in the database and we need to take steps to capture these effects. Where NTBs leads to higher costs, we follow the standard approach to modelling iceberg or dead-weight trade costs in the GTAP framework. 17 In formal terms, this means we model changes in the efficiency of production for sale in specific markets. In this sense, we can capture the impact that NTBs can have in raising costs when serving foreign markets.
Where NTBs instead involve higher prices because of rents, we model this as additional mark-ups (higher prices) accruing to firms. Reduction of NTBs then involves a surrendering of the associated rents. From firm and regulator surveys (see ECORYS 2009) a good rule of thumb is a 50:50 split of the AVEs for NTBs into costs and rents.
b. Specifying the experiment
With computational model in hand, the next step is specifying our policy experiments. We base these on values in Figure 3 -1, Table 3 -2, and Table 3 -3. For goods, we assume full tariff elimination. In addition, we generally use our AVE estimates of intra-EU trade cost reductions for the EU, and deep FTA trade cost reductions for the US. There are some exceptions to this rule however. Based on our discussion of chemicals and REACH in Section 3, we use the ECORYS estimates of trade cost savings for the chemicals sector, reflecting potential for trade cost reductions hoped for by industry but not seen in existing agreements.
For beverages and tobacco, we use the lower EU estimate for application to the US, both because the ECORYS estimates lumped this sector with processed foods (where protection is systematically higher) and because protection in this sector tends to be higher in lower and middle income countries (so that the deep FTA estimates most likely overstate the US situation). Similar to chemicals, for motor vehicles we again take the ECORYS estimates. These are only somewhat higher than the EU and deep FTA estimates, but again reflect an objective to go beyond existing agreements. Finally, for metals, we use the ECORYS estimates for the US.
All of there decisions, of course, reflect informed judgement calls.
The situation is trickier when it comes to services. At more cynical moments when working on this paper, we have considered it plausible to argue that an agreement will be signed that includes services but where, as in past agreements, nothing actually happens in terms of market access conditions for services. This is a view consistent with the pattern of values reported in Table 3 -3. However, when in a more positive mood we are more inclined to give negotiators the benefit of the doubt. There is a stated objective of improving market access in services. Yet in some sectors (distribution in the US) we already have essentially free trade, and in others we are close (communications services). Based on statements of negotiators, worries about the manoeuvring of financial institutions to undercut regulation through T-TIP, and the deep commitments already made under Basel III, we do not expect real liberalization in finance (banking and insurance) under T-TIP even with an optimistic assessment. For the other sectors, we are more agnostic. Therefore, we have opted to include 50% reduction of AVEs from Table 3 -3 for the remaining sectors (excluding finance), reflecting the rough rule of thumb that half of these AVEs might be eliminated with a real, deep set of commitments on services (meaning half of these costs are actionable). In what follows we will separate services from goods, so that reflecting the occasionally more cynical mood, we can also focus on a sub-experiment that excludes services liberalization. Our experiments (the tariffs and tariff equivalents for NTBs to be eliminated) are summarized in Table   4 -1. c. Estimated effects from T-TIP implementation Table 4 -2 summarizes our estimates of national income changes, measured as changes in real household consumption (meaning nominal household incomes by region are deflated by changes in prices), under our core T-TIP scenario. In the table, we provide a breakdown along the elements of the scenario (tariffs, goods NTBs, and services NTBs) and also across regions. For both the US and the EU, the primary action comes from goods liberalization rather than services. is that a classic, discriminatory approach to T-TIP could be costly for third countries. As noted in the introduction to this section, there are expectations of possible trade cost reductions for third countries. These are collectively referred to as "regulatory convergence spillovers" or "NTB reduction spillovers." To repeat the logic we discussed earlier, if the US and the EU launch a process of regulatory streamlining and mutual recognition, and if this process proves to be relatively non-discriminatory, there may be ancillary benefits to third countries. In effect, it may become easier to access to the combined EU-US market, in terms of regulatory barriers, than it was for the two distinct markets. Apart from informal discussion with industry and negotiators, where firms do seem to believe such potential benefits are lurking in the shadows, we have little basis for knowing exactly how large such spillovers might be. Even so, in Table 4 -3 we report estimated impacts of such spillovers. What we have done, starting from the results reported in Table 4 -2, is to further assume that 20% of the NTB cost reductions realized by US firms accessing the EU, and EU firms accessing the US, also accrue to third countries accessing those same markets. Table 4 -2 with column I in Table 4 -3 illustrates a relatively important point. The form that mutual recognition of standards and regulatory cooperation might take under T-TIP is rather central to the whole affair. With some NTB harmonization between the EU and US leading to an effective reduction in costs for third countries, benefits might, potentially, then be expected for third countries, especially upper and middle-income countries. This is one possible negotiation path, and if followed also yields the highest gains for the US and EU as well. However, it certainly is not the only path, and indeed a more protectionist approach might be more responsive to lobbying interests.
Comparison of column F in
Under such an alternative approach, if the solution for negotiated reduction of differences in regulatory systems is to establish some sort of deliberately discriminatory country of origin based mutual recognition mechanism for conformity assessments under divergent national regulations, third country exporters would then be worse off. The official narrative assumes that such spillover benefits will be realized. The magnitudes involved suggest that regardless of assumptions, it is in the interest of third countries to be rather aggressive in ensuring that non-tariff aspects of T-TIP actually are not structured to be deliberately exclusive and discriminatory.
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Final caveats: adjustment costs matter
An issue of considerable significance that we are not able to address in this paper is the transition between equilibria (i.e. the short-run adjustment to our trade policy shock). Trade economists are well aware that, in standard competitive models, the main source of long-run gain from trade is specialization and that (loosely speaking) the only way to secure large gains from trade is for policy to induce large adjustments in production structure (Ethier, 2009 ). This of course implies that, in standard competitive models, policies changes associated with large gains from trade will also be associated with potentially large transitional costs (mostly in the form of unemployment, forgone wages, and mobility costsincluding such things as loss of asset value from housing). While there is not a lot of research on this queston, the best efforts suggest that the costs are nontrivial. For example, Jacobson, LaLonde and Sullivan (Jacobson et al., 1993a, b) estimate that an average displaed worker loses $80,000 in lifetime earnings and Kletzer (2001) estimates that the average displaced worker suffers a 13% pay cut as a result of trade displacement. 18 We have already noted that research on intraindustry trade suggests that these costs may be mitigated when similar countries (i.e. the US and the EU) liberalize due to the major role of, presumptively less disruptive, intraindustry trade. Unfortunately, more recent theoretical and empirical work on trade with heterogeneous firms qualifies this last presumption, making this an issue of some concern when evaluating the effects of a major exercise in liberalization like the T-TIP.
In the standard model (as well as in models of monopolistic competition), firms are presumed to be identical. Recent empirical research suggests that this assumption is dramatically falsified (Bernard et al., 2007 (Bernard et al., , 2012 . Starting with Melitz (2003) , a sizable body of theory and empirical research has developed based on the insight that firms are heterogeneous and studying how that heterogeneity interacts with international trade (Melitz and Redding, 2015, Redding, 2011) . In fact, this leads to an interesting form of complexity: on the one hand, heterogeneous firm models provide an additional source of gains from trade as more efficient firms displace less efficient firms, thus raising productivity (Melitz and Redding, 2013, Melitz and Trefler, 2012) ; on the other, the firm-level adjustment means that there is explicit attention to short-run adjustment on the firm margin that is associated with at least transitional unemployment as (within sector) inefficient firms close and efficient firms expand. A number of recent papers have analysed adjustment to a shock which is quite relevant to the T-TIP case-the US-Canda free trade agreement (and its extension via NAFTA). Starting especially with Trefler (2004) and applying firmlevel data, these papers have examined the effect of integration with the US on Canada (e.g. Baggs, 2005 , Baggs and Brander, 2006 , Breinlich and Cuñat, 2010 , LaRochelle-Côté, 2007 , Lileeva, 2008 , Lileeva and Trefler, 2010 . The main result here is that, in the short run relatively inefficient firms exit, creating unemployment; but in the long run productivity rises and unemployed workers are absorbed. Note well that this is precisely in the context of models of the Krugman sort (except with heterogeneous firms). That is, even though rationalization may dominate intersectoral adjustment, the within sector, shortrun effects will still be negative and, potentially, substantially negative. From a political perspective, the short-run negative effects may be every bit as significant as the long-run efficiency effects. Countries with well-functioning welfare states should find it easier to liberalize in the face of such shocks than countries that lack such institutions.
APPENDIX -gravity estimates of NTB cost reductions
Empirical model outline
In this appendix, we describe the basic procedure to control for endogeneity in selection into trade agreements. For the gravity estimates reported in Section 3 of the paper, we follow Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) and Egger, Larch, Staub and Winkelmann (2011) in employing a generalized-linear exponential-family model for estimating gravity models. One merit of such models is that, unlike ordinary least squares on the log-transformed model, they obtain consistent parameters in the presence of heteroskedasticity even if it is unknown whether the disturbance term is log-additive or level-additive. Furthermore, in line with Terza (1998 Terza ( , 2009 , (Greene, 2002) , Greene (2012) , Terza et al. (2008) , and Egger, Larch, Staub and Winkelmann (2011) , we apply a control-function approach which, under a set of assumptions summarized below, is capable of absorbing the endogeneity problem and obtaining consistent parameter estimates, including the partial treatment effects of interest.
Formally, we employ imports of country j from country i, Xij, as the dependent variable and specify it as an exponential function of a linear index of the form (A1) = exp (
where is a PTA-depth measure (a scalar or a vector, depending on the specification), is a vector of observable (log) trade-cost measures (such as log distance, ….), ( ′ , ′ )′ is a conformable parameter vector, { , }re catch-all measures of exporter-and importer-specific factors (estimated as parameters on i-specific and j-specific binary indicator variables, respectively. Moreover, (A2) � � = ℎ ℎ = �ℎ 1, , … , ℎ , � ℎ , is a control function which is derived from the assumption of multivariate normality of the disturbances between the processes of selecting into depth δ=1,…,D and the stochastic term about . The application here represents an innovation on the existing literature, which generally focuses on binary selection in the case of trade agreements.
The control function absorbs the potential endogeneity bias (i.e., the correlation of with the disturbances). After introducing a binary indicator variable 1[ = ] which is one if the statement in square brackets is true and zero else, the elements ℎ , for δ=1,…,D are defined as follows. These are referred to as inverse Mills' ratios (for = ) in the literature (see, e.g. Wooldridge, 2010) . They depend on the density, ( , ), and the cumulative distribution function, Ф( , ), which, in a reduced form, depends on common observable characteristics, , and the depth-specific parameter vector , .
Notice that the assumption about multivariate normality is specific here, since selection into states δ is mutually exclusive (a country-pair can only apply a single level of depth δ of an agreement). This means that we can think of the variance-covariance matrix for each country-pair ij where we order the data such that the terms for the D latent variables generating ℎ , appear at the top and the stochastic term for appears at the bottom. Apart from diagonal elements throughout, this matrix would then contain only non-zero elements in the bottom row and the right column.
A somewhat different approach to the control function could be based on an ordered probit model about = rather than individual probit models for each state δ. This approach would be somewhat more parsimonious in terms of the number of parameters to be estimated. In contrast to the aforementioned approach, this procedure would be based on δ-specific elements ℎ , for δ=1,…,D which are defined as Notice that −1 and are depth-specific, implicitly-determined threshold values which determine whether country-pair ij is in regime − 1 versus . Hence, in contrast to ℎ , estimated from individual probit models as in (A3) above and say DK parameters (where K is the number of parameters per probit equation), their counterparts in (A4) are estimated based on only D+K-1 parameters (where the K-1 are the parameters on { 1 , … , } , excluding 0 , which is part of the D parameters in the base model).
Basic assumptions
The control-function approach outlined above rests on three basic assumptions. First, that the disturbances of the latent variables determining selection into a particular depth of trade agreements and the outcome equation (for ) are multivariate normal, whereby the stochastic terms for each country-pair ij are drawn independently from but identically to those of other pairs. In the present case, they are bivariate normal for each and every level of depth, δ. Second, the universe of instruments collected in (which includes all determinants of the outcome model except for the elements in ℎ and some additional identifying regressors, see Cameron and Trivedi (2005) ) should be independent of the multivariate error terms (i.e., the instruments should be exogenous). Third and finally, the variances of the latent processes determining selection-intoagreement-depth are normalized to unity.
